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ASHBACKER RITES IN ADMINISTRATNE PRACTICE: 
A CASE STUDY OF BROADCAST REGULATION 
JACOB W. MAYER* 
& 
MICHAEL BOTEIN** 
When more than one party applies to a federal administrative 
agency for an instrument of authorization which cannot be granted 
to all applicants-i.e., the applications are "mutually exclusive"-
each applicant, in order to protect its interests, generally must 
have an opportunity to participate in any proceedings involving the 
competing applications. l Mutual exclusivity arises most familiarly, 
of course, in the contexts of broadcast stations and airline routes. 
The federal courts have, with increasing frequency, set minimum 
standards of participation in comparative proceedings on mutually 
exclusive applications in order to assure fair treatment to all appli-
cants. 
Judicial review of agency consolidation procedures developed 
in the wake of Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC. 2 Extensive de-
velopment of the Ashbacker doctrine has occurred in broadcast 
licensing proceedings before the Federal Communications Com-
mission. 3 A survey of the Commission's experience provides some 
insight into the problems involved in administration of the doc-
* Member, District of Columbia Bar. B.S. 1954, J.D. 1957, University of Kentucky; 
LL.M. 1958, George Washington University. 
** Director, Communications Media Center, New York Law School. B.A. 1966, 
Wesleyan University; J.D. 1969, Cornell University; LL.M. 1972, Columbia Univer-
sity. 
1. These comparative hearings, resulting from some form of mutual exclusivity, 
naturally are quite distinct from petitions to deny an authorization on the ground that 
an incumbent licensee has defaulted -on its public interest obligations. Petitions to 
deny renewal applications offer an important tool to groups attempting to gain con-
cessions from broadcasters in regard to programming and employment policies. See 
Schneyer, An Overview of Public Interest Law Activity in the Communications 
Field, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 619, 623. 
2. 326 U.S. 327 (1945). 
3. Naturally, other agencies have also had to cope with Ashbacker. See, e.g., Cin-
cinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 389 F.2d 272 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 
(1968); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 228 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The CAB's ex-
periences in applying Ashbacker to route certification proceedings are competently 
analyzed in Note, The Ashbacker Rule and the CAB: Cumbersome Procedure v. Pub-
lic Interest, 44 VA. L. REv. 1147 (1958). 
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trine; after all, the Commission has had the longest experience 
with the doctrine and has experimented with a variety of ap-
proaches designed to limit the impact of Ashbacker on FCC admin-
istrative processes. 
I. BIRTH OF THE DOCTRINE 
Ashbacker arose as a result of an application, in March 1944, 
by the Fetzer Broadcasting Company for a new AM station in 
Grand Rapids, Michigan, on a frequency of 1230 kiloherti. Two 
months later, Ashbacker Radio Corporation filed an application to 
change the frequency of its station in nearby Muskegon, Michigan, 
from 1490 kilohertz to 1230 kilohertz. Operation on this new fre-
quency would have created "intolerable" electrical interference 
with the proposed Fetzer station, making both stations' signals im-
possible to receive over a wide area. In June 1944, the Commis-
sion, declaring the applications to be "actually exclusive," granted 
Fetzer's application and designated Ashbacker's for a subsequent 
hearing. In order to prevail at that hearing, Ashbacker would have 
been required to show that its proposed operation would better 
serve the public interest than would Fetzer's, but the Commission 
nevertheless denied Ashbacker's petition for reconsideration of the 
grant to Fetzer on the ground that Ashbacker's application had not 
yet been rejected and would be afforded a full hearing before the 
Commission. 4 
The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's action. Justice 
Douglas, writing for the majority, treated the problem as one of 
reconciling the internally inconsistent provisions of section 309(a) of 
the Communications Act of 19345 in relation to mutually exclusive 
4. 326 U.S. at 328-29. 
5 The statute in effect at the time of the Ashbacker decision was the original 
version of section 309(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch. 
652, § 309(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1085 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 309(a), (e) 
(1970». It provided that: 
If upon examination of any application for a station license or for the re-
newal or modification of a station license the Commission shall determine 
that public interest, convenience, or necessity would be served by the grant-
ing thereof, it shall authorize the issuance, renewal, or modification thereof 
in accordance with said finding. In the event the Commission upon exam-
ination of any such application does not reach such decision with respect 
thereto, it shall notify the applicant thereof, shall fix and give notice of a 
time and place for hearing thereon, and shall afford such applicant an oppor-
tunity to be heard under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe. 
Under current law, when the Commission designates competing applications for a 
hearing, it acts pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 309(a), (e) (1970). 
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applications. The perceived inconsistency arose from the fact that 
section 309(a) not only gave the Commission authority to grant ap-
plications without a hearing, but also gave applicants the right to a 
hearing before denial of their applications. 6 Because the granting of 
one application necessarily precluded the granting of those applica-
tions with which it was mutually exclusive, Justice Douglas felt that 
the statutory hearing on such applications would become an 
"empty thing."7 As the second applicant, Ashbacker would have 
had to persuade the Commission to revoke the grant to Fetzer be-
fore its own application could have been granted. The Court thus 
concluded that "[b]y the grant of the Fetzer application petitioner 
has been placed under a greater burden than if its hearing had 
been earlier."8 The Court sought to limit its decision to one pro-
cedural issue and held that "where two bona fide applications are 
mutually exclusive the grant of one without a hearing to both de-
prives the loser of the opportunity which Congress chose to give 
him."9 In attempting to provide the Commission with a means to 
diminish the impact of the decision, Justice Douglas noted that 
"[a]pparently no regulation exist[ed] which, for orderly administra~' 
tion, requir[ed] an application for a frequency, previously applied. 
for, . . . to be filed within a certain date. "10 
Ashbacker has become a basic tenet of federal administrative 
procedure but its application has resulted in a rule which is often 
too broad for broadcast licenses, let alone for other regulatory pur-
poses. First, although the Court attempted to limit its decision to 
the facts before it, it failed to do so. Fundamentally, the Court 
confronted a very simple issue: Did the Commission abuse its dis-
cretion in failing to consolidate the Fetzer and Ashbacker applica-
tions for a hearing before expressing a preference for one over the 
other? As the Court noted briefly, the Commission had a proce-
dure for discretionary consolidation of mutually exclusive applica-
tions;l1 indeed, the Commission's use of discretion may have been 
6. 326 U.S. at 329-30. 
7. Id. at 330. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, argued that these restrictions 
rendered the hearing "barren" and a "mere formality." Id. at 337, 339 (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting). 
8. Id. at 332 (opinion of Douglas, J.). 
9. Id. at 333. 
10. Id. at 333 n.9. The regulations to which Justice Douglas alluded were sub-
sequently promulgated. The current versions of these "cut-off" regulations are found 
at 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.227(b)(1), 1.571(c), 1.591(b) (1977). See notes 84 & 85 and accom-
panying text infra. 
11. 326 U.S. at 331 n.5. The regulations in effect at the time enabled the Com-
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a perfectly reasonable way of resolving the technical inconsistency 
in the statute's language. In point of fact, the Commission may 
have viewed Ashbacker's application as a dilatory tactic directed 
against a potential competitor by an incumbent licensee and at-
tempted to deal with it summarily. This may have been a reason-
able approach, but not one which the Commission could argue 
very forcefully on appeal, having failed to raise the issue below. 
Second, the ultimate effect of the Court's decision was to give 
incumbents an opportunity to "sandbag" potential competitors. 
After Ashbacker, existing broadcasters could simply file applications 
which would create exclusivity problems. The resulting hearing and 
appeal could easily consume several years12-a possibility which 
the Court apparently did not anticipate. The Ashbacker doctrine 
may make perfectly good sense as a means of resolving a contest 
between newcomers, or between incumbents wishing to change fa-
cilities, since it would not, under such circumstances, delay the en-
try of a potential competitor. However, in a contest between an 
incumbent and a newcomer, the doctrine inherently favors the 
incumbent by allowing it to remain in operation until the conflict 
is resolved. 13 
Finally, the Court did not-and reasonably could not-foresee 
that technological changes would make comparative hearings inap-
propriate for at least some types of licenses. As will be noted later, 
however, the last few decades have witnessed some sweeping tech-
nological changes within the broadcast media. 14 
The Ashbacker doctrine thus arose in a context which was not 
ideal for the Commission's long-range policy decisionmaking. In-
deed, the Court may have precipitated quite unintended results by 
providing a new rationale for restricting entry into, and new 
technology for, broadcasting. And the lower federal courts may 
have compounded this effect by being overly enthusiastic in finding 
instances of mutual exclusivity. 
II. PROBLEMS IN ADMINISTRATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
The terms of any basic doctrine inevitably raise secondary is-
sues which, in tum, affect the meaning of the doctrine itself. 
mission to "consolidate for hearing ... any applications which ... present conflict· 
ing claims of the same nature" when "such action [would] best conduce to the 
proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice." ld. 
12. Community Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 753, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See 
also W. JONES, LICENSING OF MAJOR BROADCAST FACILITIES BY THE FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 144·54 (1962). 
13. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976). 
14. See text accompanying notes 92·110 infra. 
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Ashbacker has been no exception to this process. Indeed, the 
Court has given little guidance since its original decision. 
A. Bona Fide Applications 
The first task confronting an agency is to determine what con-
stitutes a bona fide application within the meaning of Ashbacker. 
At least four distinct issues arise: (1) has an application been filed 
solely for the purpose of preventing the Commission from acting 
upon another and otherwise unopposed application; (2) is an appli-
cation timely filed for comparative consideration; (3) if timely filed, 
does an application sufficiently conform to statutory and administra-
tive processing requirements; and (4) if the application does not 
conform, what effect should be given to a request for waiver of the 
standards? 
In order to preserve the integrity of its processes, any agency 
will naturally seek to prevent the filing of applications designed 
solely to delay the granting of other applications. Whether an ap-
plication is so intended is, however, essentially a factual question 
and does not raise significant theoretical issues. 15 
The Communications Act sets forth requirements for applica-
tions for new broadcast stations;16 and the Commission has supple-
mented these statutory requirements with regulations. 17 In order to 
obtain the information necessary to evaluate an applicant's qualifi-
15. See, e.g., Grenco, Inc., 28 F.C.C.2d 166, 21 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 560 (1971). 
In Grenco, the Commission offered certain guidelines to be utilized in determining 
whether an application is a "strike" application-one filed with the "motive or pur-
pose ... to obstruct or delay another application." Id. at 167, 21 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 
at 562. The guidelines suggested by the Commission include the timing of th.e appli-
cation, the good faith of the applicant, and the "economic and competitive benefit" 
accruing to the applicant from the application. Id., 21 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) at 562. In 
order to comprehend the nature of this inquiry, it is necessary to understand that the 
problem is one of resolving a factual question and that "each particular set of cir-
cumstances must be individually examined since the matter of purpose or motive 
cannot be Scientifically defined." Id., 21 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) at 562. More recently, 
however, the District of Columbia Circuit indicated that the Commission should 
clarify its standards concerning rejection of "strike" applications. See Faulkner Radio, 
Inc. v. FCC, 557 F.2d 866, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
16. 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1970). For factors relevant to the Commission's review of 
an application, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a), 310, 313 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
The Commission employs a two-step licensing procedure in which a construction 
permit is issued initially and a license is issued only after completion of construction 
in accordance with the terms of the construction permit. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 308(a), 319 
(1970). In all but the most unusual circumstances, the station license will be issued. 
As a result, almost all controversies arise while issuance of the construction permit is 
under consideration. 
17. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.37,73.24 (1977). 
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cations, the Commission requires that such applications be filed on 
FCC Form 301.18 To acquire Ashbacker rights, it is necessary to file 
a Form 301; mere notification of an intention to file is insufficient. 19 
Indeed, until an application is filed, a prospective applicant lacks 
standing.2o If the Commission waives its internal procedural rules 
and grants an earlier application in less time than might reasonably 
be anticipated, a normally timely application is not entitled to con-
sideration.21 
Pressure therefore exists to file an application speedily in 
order to acquire Ashbacker rights as soon as possible. This creates 
the temptation to file a pro forma application and later amend it to 
correct any defects-or even to file a defective application in order 
to delay a potential competitor. To protect itself from this possibil-
ity, the Commission's rules allow it to dismiss a patently defective 
application either before or after acceptance for filing. 22 In prac-
tice, the Commission exercises discretion in accepting or rejecting 
defective applications. While the Commission may reject an appli-
cation which fails to satisfy its requirements,23 it may, for example, 
accept one which does not satisfy the statutory verification re-
quirement. 24 This use of discretion seems to protect both the 
18. 47 C.F.R. § 1.533(a)(1) (1977). 
19. Federal Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 560, 566-68 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 350 U.S. 923 (1955). Cf. Telegraph Herald Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 66 
F.2d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (failure to formally apply for a permit will deprive a 
party of an appealable interest with respect to an FRC order; mere intention to apply 
is insufficient). 
20. Telegraph Herald Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 66 F.2d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir. 
1933). 
21. Federal Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 560, 567 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 350 U.S. 923 (1955). 
22. 47 C.F.R. § 1.566(a) (1977). In Commission practice, an application is first 
"tendered" for filing. If acceptable, the application is later accepted as of the date of 
tender. This procedure results in public notice of the filing of new applications prior 
to examination for patent defects and thus expedites action on applications found to 
be acceptable. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.564 (1977). 
23. For example, in UMSJ, Inc., 8 F.C.C.2d 533, 10 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 404 
(1967), the Commission refused to consider an application which it deemed to be 
unacceptable. The Commission reasoned that before an applicant could acquire any 
rights entitling it to consideration, its application "must be acceptable for filing." ld., 
10 HAD. REG. 2d (P&F) at 405. Failure to maintain the distinction between accept-
able and unacceptable applications would tend to encourage "strike" applications. 
ld., 10 HAD. REG. 2d (P&F) at 405. See note 15 supra. 
24. Johnson Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1949). In 
Johnson, the court noted that although an unverified document could not be acted 
upon, it could nevertheless be accepted, and the "initial failure to verify [could] be 
cured by later verification." ld. 
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Commission's processes and the interests of applicants who suffer 
inadvertent mishaps after making reasonable attempts to comply 
with the Commission's requirements. 25 
A more difficult problem is created by a patently defective ap-
plication coupled with a request for waiver based upon a claim of 
"good cause." In order to preserve the rights of parties who are 
willing to speculate on this type of approach, the Commission's 
rules permit acceptance of a patently defective application if it is 
accompanied by a showing in support of waiver.26 The Commission 
can then dispose of the waiver request and application in at least 
three ways: (1) grant the waiver and keep the application on file; (2) 
order a hearing as to whether the waiver should be granted; or (3) 
deny the waiver and dismiss the application. No matter how the 
Commission disposes of the waiver request, its exercise of discre-
tion normally cannot be challenged; after all, it need not conduct a 
useless hearing. 27 When a defective application requires a waiver, 
it does not acquire Ashbacker rights unless the waiver is granted. 28 
Similarly, a hearing on a waiver request gives a party only pro-
visional Ashbacker rights pending the waiver decision. 29 
The status of "contingent" applications presents an interesting 
example of waiver problems, even though Ashbacker rights may 
not always be involved. The typical case arises when A files an 
application to modify its station license for operation on a new fre-
quency, resulting in abandonment of its old frequency if the appli-
cation is granted; B then files an application for A's original fre-
quency, contingent upon a grant of A's application.3o B can acquire 
no rights against A's initial operation;31 and pending satisfaction of 
25. See B.J. Hart, 20 RAD. REG. (P&F) 301 (1960), where applicant's attorney was 
permitted to file nunc pro tunc in order to supply essential material inadvertently 
left on a desk when the application was tendered. 
26. 47 C.F.R. § 1.566(a) (1977). 
27. In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956), the 
Court stated that "[we] do not think Congress intended the Commission to waste 
time on applications that do not state a valid basis for a hearing." 
28. See Petersburg Television Corp., No. 61-800 (F.C.C. 1961). 
29. E.g., St. Louis Telecast, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 625, 626-27 n.2, 710, 12 RAD. REG. 
(P&F) 1289, 1294-95 n.2, 1366 (1955). 
30. By filing a contingent application, an applicant may shorten the time that ac-
tion on its application is delayed once the frequency becomes available since appli-
cations are normally processed by file number in order of filing. See 47 C.F.R. § 
1.571(c) (1977). The Commission sometimes tolerates this procedure in order to pro-
tect the public from the loss of service which might otherwise result. 
31. It should be noted that Ashbacker rights can be acquired by filing a compet-
ing application against an application for renewal of a license. E.g., Hearst Radio, 
Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 6 RAD. REG. (P&F) 994 (1951); 47 C.F.R. § 1.227(b)(6) (1977). 
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the contingency, B's application does not receive Ashhacker rights 
as against the applications of third parties. 32 Even if the con-
tingency is ultimately resolved, B does not acquire a preferred 
status vis-a-vis later-filed applications. 33 
B. Matters of Definition 
When two applications are filed for the same frequency and 
location, they are obviously exclusive. However, few cases present 
such clear-cut facts. More typically, applications propose stations at 
some distance from each other, so that a grant of competing appli-
cations would not physically preclude both operations, although 
each station might be required to operate at less than maximum 
efficiency. (As normally used in Ashbacker situations, "mutual 
exclusivity" and "preclusion" are conclusions of law34 that a grant of 
one application would bar a grant of another.) 
Since an agency's finding of mutual exclusivity amounts to a 
conclusion of law, the reasons supporting such a finding vary in 
different types of administrative practice.35 In the broadcast field, 
three types of situations, other than electrical interference, often 
lead to a finding of actual exclusivity: (1) mutual economic exclusiv-
ity resulting from the limited size of the station's market; (2) 
exclusivity due to circumstances beyond the Commission's control; 
and (3) exclusivity arising through the operation of the Commis-
sion's rules. 
Broadcasters have recently been concerned with the possibility of losing a broadcast 
license through such a procedure. From the standpoint of this discussion, challenges 
at renewal time do not warrant separate consideration. A full history of the subject is 
available in E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULA-
TION 112 (1973). 
32. Northside Broadcasting Corp., 14 F.C.C. 57, 58, 4 RAD. REG. (P&F) 411, 
412-13 (1949). A discussion of similar treatment of contingent applications at the 
Civil Aeronautics Board is contained in Note, The Ashbacker Rule and the CAB: 
Cumbersome Procedure v. Public Interest, 44 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1151 (1958). 
33. Jack Gross Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 80, 8i, 3 RAD. REG. (P&F) 1340, 1342 
(1947). The Commission noted that its practice is not to consider these contingent 
applications until the contingency has been resolved. "The purpose of this practice 
... is to avoid giving any particular applicant, or applicants, an undue advantage 
over other applicants who may wish to apply for the frequency to be vacated." Id. 
34. These findings are referred to as conclusions of law in the sense that deter-
minations regarding acceptable levels of interference are reached by application of 
the Commission's rules. 
35. For example, the most significant possibility for mutual exclusivity which has 
developed in the field of aeronautics arises from economic factors. See Duggan, The 
Ashbacker Doctrine and Proceedings Before the Civil Aeronautics Board, 46 GEO. 
L.J. 282, 294 (1957); Note, The Ashbacker Rule and the CAB: Cumbersome Proce-
dure v. Public Interest, 44 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1150 (1958). 
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Mutual economic exclusivity is relatively rare in broadcasting. 
It deserves mention, however, to avoid confusion with the some-
what similar and far more common Carroll36 situation in which an 
existing station seeks protection from the adverse economic impact 
of a new station in its market. Although similar to Ashbacker, Car-
roll problems involve petitions to deny the granting of a license 
rather than those involving competing applications; only the new 
application may be granted or denied and there is generally no 
claim that both stations cannot survive even though one will be in-
jured.37 Mutual economic exclusivity arises when there are two ap-
plications for different frequencies in the same location-both of 
which could be granted from an engineering standpoint-but where 
consolidation is requested on the ground that an area lacks suffi-
cient revenue to support both stations. 38 In practical terms, this 
situation rarely arises because a second applicant would likely con-
sider a venture too risky if there were any indication that a market 
might not be able to support two stations. Tactical considerations 
may lead the second applicant to propose an operation which wQuld 
generate electrical interference with the first station in order to 
guarantee a comparative hearing.39 This stance also may have the 
attraction of shortening the delay before the second application is 
considered. 40 
A second and rare type of mutual exclusiVity arises when cir-
cumstances beyond the Commission's control militate against grant-
ing more than one application. For example, in Chronicle Publish-
36. Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
37. ld. at 442. It should be noted that the critical factor in Carroll situations is the 
totality of service in the area and not economic harm to the broadcaster. ld. at 443. 
See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473-76 (1940). For further 
discussion of Carroll, see Mayer, Sanders Brothers Revisited: Protection of Broad-
casters from the Consequences of Economic Competition, 49 Ky. L.J. 370 (1961); 
Givens, Refusal of Radio and Television Licenses on Economic Grounds, 46 VA. L. 
REv. 1391 (1960). 
38. This problem may also involve Carroll considerations in some situations, 
such as those which would arise between an application for renewal of a license and 
an application for a construction permit for a new broadcast station. E.g., K-six Tele-
vision, Inc., 2 F.C.C.2d 1021, 7 RAn. REG. 2d (P&F) 128 (1966). It is also desirable 
to distinguish the recurring situations in which competing technologies (for example, 
cable television versus over-the-air teleVision) are involved; traditional Ashbacker 
doctrine presupposes the same technology. 
39. The criteria applied in comparative hearings are not directly relevant to 
Ashbacker problems. See Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationality in Compara-
tive Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1971). 
40. Compare the discussion in note 30 supra. 
470 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24 
ing CO.,41 airspace approval was available for only one of the two 
towers proposed by each applicant.42 Even if the Commission 
granted both applications, the distinct possibility existed that only 
one of the two stations could actually be constructed.43 Recogniz-
ing the mutual exclusivity inherent in airspace considerations, the 
FCC denied one of the applications and thus effectively permitted 
its decision to be controlled by the actions of a third party. 
The Commission's own rules create the third and most sig-
nificant type of mutual exclusivity. To he sure, the Commission's 
rulemaking powers44 allow it to avoid Ashbacker problems in some 
services by employing devices such as assigning frequencies on a 
non-exclusive basis. 45 But this approach is of little practical help in 
broadcasting46 because stations must be on the air for many hours 
with maximum power. The Commission thus approaches broadcast 
interference problems by determining tolerable interference limits 
and authorizing stations to operate within them. 47 The two most 
important determinants of a station's signal strength are the fre-
quency on which it operates and the amount of power with which 
it transmits. An additional factor which complicates the problem of 
placing stations is that signals interfere with those on adjacent fre-
quencies and even with those on harmonic frequencies48-i.e., fre-
quencies which are multiples of a station's frequency. An alloca-
tions system thus must limit a station's power and maintain 
minimum mileage separations between stations on the same fre-
41. No. 59-407 (F.C.C. 1959). 
42. 47 U.S.C. § 303(q) (1970) gives the Commission authority to deny applications 
which propose to use towers which constitute a hazard to air navigation. E.g., Sim-
mons v. FCC, 145 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1944). The Commission has established pro-
cedures for coordinating its jurisdiction in this area with the various aeronautical 
interests. 47 C.F.R. §§ 17.4, 17.7, 17.8, 17.10, 17.48, 17.49 (1977). 
43. Of course, an applicant is entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether its 
proposed tower would constitute a hazard to air navigation. See, e.g., Maine Radio 
and Television Co., No. 61-68 (F.C.C. 1961). 
44. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 303(f), 303(r) (1970). 
45. For example, 47 C.F.R. § 74.402(e) (1977) provides, in pertinent part, that 
"[rJemote pickup broadcast stations or systems will not be granted exclusive fre-
quency assignments. The same frequency or frequencies may be assigned to other 
licensees in the same area." 
46. 47 U.S.C. § 153(0) (1970) defines broadcasting as "the dissemination of radio 
communications intended to be received by the public, directly or by the inter-
mediary of relay stations." The principal broadcast services are standard (AM), fre-
quency modulation (FM), and television broadcast (TV). 
47. For a discussion of the technical aspects of broadcast interference problems, 
see H. HEAD, WAVE PROPAGATION AND INTERFERENCE EFFECTS IN THE TELEVI-
SION BROADCAST BANDS (1961). 
48. 47 C.F.R. § 73.698, Table IV (1977). 
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quency and/or related frequencies. Problems of mutual exclusivity 
are thus not confined to stations which operate on the same fre-
quency; they also may involve stations on different but electrically 
related frequencies. 
The Commission has employed two basic approaches in plac-
ing stations: first, it establishes the areas in which frequencies may 
be used; and second, it creates standards for sites from which to 
operate. The Commission has selected the option of predetermin-
ing allocations in the television and FM- services with apparently 
satisfactory results.49 The "you find it/we grant it" system has been 
utilized in AM broadcasting, largely fot the historical reason that 
there were already 732 stations in operation when the Federal 
Radio Commission was established. 50 The existence of so many sta-
tions persuaded the Commission not to attempt to regroup existing 
stations. 51 
The present television allocation scheme is based upon a "Ta-
ble of Assignments"52 which specifies the available television chan-
nels53 in each market. 54 An applicant must be able to locate a pro-
posed station in order to provide its principal community with a 
signal of at least a minimum intensity. 55 Other stations on electri-
cally related frequencies generally are prohibited from locating 
transmitters at less than specified distances from this site. 56 If no 
co-channel station has been proposed-i.e., no specific transmitter 
site exists to determine distances-the Commission fixes "reference 
49. See Sixth Report on Television Allocations, 1 RAD. REG. (P&F), Part 3, at 
91:601 (1952). The Sixth Report concluded a four-year rule making proceeding by 
establishing the present system of television allocations. 
50. FRC ANN. REP. 2 (1927). The Federal Radio Commission was established by 
the Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), and was the 
predecessor to the FCC. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 603,604 (1970). 
51. The Federal Radio Commission did, however, reassign frequencies at the 
existing station sites in order to lessen interference. FRC ANN. REP. 8 (1927). 
52. E.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.606 (1977). FM allocation employs a similar approach 
which, in the interest of brevity, will not be discussed herein. 
53. These are frequency bands defined in 47 C.F.R. § 73.603(a) (1977). 
54. A certain amount of flexibility is added by permitting the selection of a prin-
cipal community within 15 miles of the community listed in the Table. 47 C.F.R. § 
73.607(b) (1977). 
55. 47 C.F.R. § 73.685(a) (1977). 
56. rd. § 73.610 (1977). It should be noted that two applications which both com-
ply with these rules may still be filed for sites which fail to meet the required sep-
aration and thus result in mutual exclusivity. Of course, in unusual circumstances, 
the Commission may conduct a hearing in order to determine whether a minor 
waiver of the separation requirement should be granted. See Nathan Frank, 20 RAD. 
REG. (P&F) 806, 808 (1960). 
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points" which prevent location of a new station unreasonably close 
to any vacant assignments. 57 These mileage separations and the 
power and antenna height limitations are a station's only protection 
against interference from other stations;58 a certain amount of neg-
ligible interference is built into the system. 
An example illustrates the relatively limited potential for 
Ashbacker problems under the television or FM allocations system. 
Assume that channels 3 and 6 are assigned to a community in the 
Table of Assignments. Since, under present rules, television and 
FM applicants cannot propose their own frequencies and are also 
limited to one facility per market, A and B could file applications 
for channel 3, while C and D could file applications for channel 6;59 
A and B would be mutually exclusive, while C and D would be 
mutually exclusive. 6o As a result, two relatively simple comparative 
proceedings would allow the Commission to award both channels. 61 
The electrical propagation characteristics of AM signals involve 
a number of factors which are not present in television broadcast-
ing. 62 In essence, the AM allocation system seeks to ensure that a 
station has a normally protected contour against electrical interfer-
57. 47 C.F.R. § 73.611 (1977). 
58. Id. § 73.612(a) (1977). 
59. The Commission's procedural rules prevent a party from filing applications 
for more than one television channel in a particular community. 47 C.F.R. § 1.516(a) 
(1977). In the past, the Commission's procedures allowed applications for more than 
one channel to be filed, with the practical result that comparative television hearings 
were more complex. See, e.g., KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 177 F.2d 40 (D.C. 
Cir.1949). 
60. 47 C.F.R. § 1.572(d) (1977). Nonetheless, any of the applicants could allege 
the existence of economic mutual exclusivity as a basis for consolidation of the two 
proceedings. Cf. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 228 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (per 
curiam) (allegation of mutual exclusivity by one applicant entitles it to a preliminary 
hearing on the issue of exclusivity or a comparative hearing). 
61. This conclusion is based upon the assumption that two two-party proceedings 
would be easier to conclude than one four-party proceeding. Of course, to the extent 
that comparative hearings are expected to produce the best qualified applicants, it 
would seem more sensible to combine the proceedings in order to be sure of select-
ing the two best qualified applicants of the four. Cf. Azalea Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 561, 
563,22 HAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 909, 911-12 (1971) (public interest best served by having 
as many qualified applicants as possible compete for each broadcast facility). Com-
pare note 59 supra. 
62. For example, standard broadcast signals depend on "sky waves," which are 
reflected by the ionized layers of the stratosphere to areas not directly served by a 
station. Since the degree of ionization depends on sunlight, the characteristics of the 
signals broadcast may vary according to the time of day or night. This, in turn, re-
quires that stations be divided into categories in a manner not necessary to television 
broadcast. (The reader interested in a clearer picture of the outline of standard 
broadcast allocation may consult 47 C.F.R. § 73.183-190 (1977).) 
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ence from other stations. 63 In selecting a site and frequency for an 
AM station, an applicant thus must use a site from which its fre-
quency will not interfere with stations on the same or adjacent fre-
quencies and which will not receive an unreasonable amount of 
interference within its own proposed service area. 64 
As a result of this allocation system, two problems exist in 
AM broadcasting. First, section 307(b) of the Communications Act 
requires the Commission to "make such distribution of licenses, 
frequencies, hours of operation, and of power among the several 
States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable 
distribution of radio service to each of the same. "65 This statutory 
directive rarely creates difficulties in television or FM regulation 
since the rulemaking mechanism underlying the Table of Assign-
ments generally satisfies the requirements of section 307(b).66 
However, since AM site allocation is not covered by the Table of 
Assignments,67 individual applicants make the first proposal for 
service in a given area. Under these circumstances, section 307(b) 
considerations may result in the threshold disqualification of an ap-
plicant without a comparative hearing if it fails to propose appro-
priate service.68 However, in cases where noncompliance with sec-
tion 307(b) requirements is less apparent, such considerations may 
63. This statement is subject to technical qualifications beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
64. E.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.37 (1977). 
65. 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1970). 
66. Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
See also Coastal Bend Television Co. v. FCC, 234 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1956). In any 
case, the Commission is free to avoid the section 307(b) issue at the rulemaking stage 
and defer it for subsequent adjudication. E.g., New Orleans Deintermixture Case, 22 
F.C.C. 396, 403, 15 RAD. REG. (P&F) 1603, 1611 (1957). 
67. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra. 
68. CJ. FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1955) (deci-
sion in favor of one applicant over the other on the basis of community need, where 
each applicant sought to serve a different community, is proper even in the absence 
of a preliminary finding that both are equally able to serve their respective com-
munities). 
The Commission has experienced difficulty in insuring that AM service is both 
"efficient" and "equitable," as is apparently required by section 307(b). This type of 
conflict may arise where the most efficient allocation of frequencies, motivated by 
the purpose of providing service to the greatest area and population possible, is in-
compatible with the "equitable" goal of providing a local radio station to each sepa-
rate and distinct community. When such a conflict arises in a proceeding involVing 
competing applications for the same frequency, the Commission is likely to give 
greater weight to the goal of equitable allocation of frequencies. See Cohen & Russo, 
The Anomaly in Section 307(b) oj the Communications Act oj 1934, 11 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 202, 202-03 (1960). 
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not permit the denial of a comparative hearing. 69 
A second and administratively more troublesome problem in-
volves the "linking" of competing applications. An example of link-
ing would arise if two applicants proposed new stations in the same 
community on frequencies of 1200 kilohertz and 1260 kilohertz, 
and a third applicant then filed for 1230 kilohertz-which is adja-
cent to both 1200 kilohertz and 1260 kilohertz. The third applica-
tion would link the two other applications since each would be 
mutually exclusive with the proposed operation on 1230 kilohertz. 
The Commission thus would need to designate all three applica-
tions for a hearing in order to determine which one to grant. At 
one time, linking created serious administrative difficulties since 
the filing of only a few applications could create a linking problem 
and require hearings for several different parties. 70 The problems 
would be more complicated if the links were filed after the other 
applications had already been processed. 71 As discussed below, 
however, the "cut-off" rules now limit problems of linking. 72 
III. ATTEMPTS To CONTAIN ASHBACKER 
The Commission has developed a variety· of procedural devices 
to limit Ashbacker's impact on its processes. Several approaches 
merit brief discussion even though they cannot be adapted to all 
situations. First, the Commission is sometimes able to assign fre-
quencies on a non-exclusive basis, thereby authorizing their use by 
all who wish to share them. 73 
Second, in order to facilitate new service to the public despite 
delays in reaching a final decision, the Commission may issue a 
"Special Temporary Authorization" (STA) during the pendency of a 
comparative hearing to allow one or more of the parties to conduct 
an interim operation on the contested frequency.74 STAs are usu-
ally subject to the express condition that the interim operator's in-
vestment and performance be irrelevant to the Commission's later 
comparative evaluation of the applications. At first, this procedure 
69. ld. at 206, 209-10. 
70. FCC ANN. REP. 64 (1959). 
71. AM Processing Procedure, 26 F.C.C. 369, 370, 18 RAn. REG. (P&F) 1565, 
1566 (1959). 
72. See text accompanying notes 84 & 85 infra. 
73. See note 45 supra. 
74. See Community Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 753, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1960); 
Peoples Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 286, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1953). 
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was approved as being consistent with Ashbacker,75 but was later 
limited in C01Jununity Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 76 In tones rem-
iniscent of Ashbacker, then-Judge Burger stated that "the grant 
of temporary authority to one of several competing applicants be-
fore there has been [a comparative] hearing" is an "extraordinary 
procedure" which is "pregnant with danger to truly comparative 
consideration. "77 He emphasized that the interim operator, if not 
ultimately chosen, could lose a substantial amount of money. 
Burger thus feared that a Commission of "mortal men" would be 
tempted-albeit unwillingly-to favor the interim operator in its 
final decision. 78 The court distinguished COllununity Broadcasting 
from prior cases on the ground that the public had already received 
service from another station 79 and therefore had less need for an 
interim operation. The court suggested that the grant of an STA 
was held to be an appropriate procedure in prior cases only where 
"the public interest ... overbalance[d] the possible disadvantages 
"80 
After this setback, the Commission amended its rules to allow 
joint interim operations provided all of the applicants for a facility 
are afforded an opportunity to participate.81 But this approach also 
has inherent problems; it may provide an incentive to file applica-
tions merely to share an interim operation's profits, or it may en-
courage parties to stall in order to continue receiving revenues 
from an interim operation if they are not confident of winning. 
Two other approaches to the Ashbacker problem deserve brief 
mention, even though they are of limited utility. First, where fre-
quencies are freely available and the grant of an application will not 
preclude a subsequent applicant from receiving a comparable facil-
ity, it may be feasible to grant the first qualified application with-
out having an Ashbacker hearing. 82 Second, the Commission will, 
with the consent of all parties and on the basis of the applications, 
75. See Peoples Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 286, 288 (D.C. Cir. 
1953). 
76. 274 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1960). 
77. ld. at 758-59. 
78. ld. at 759. 
79. ld. at 761 n.6. 
80. ld. at 758. See also Peoples Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 286 
(D.C. Cir. 1953), where the grant of an STA was approved because it was "designed 
to preserve the only existing service" in the area. ld. at 288. 
81. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.592(b) (1977). 
82. Fostering Expanded Use of UHF Television Channels, No. 61-993 (F.C.C. 
1961). 
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make its decision without a hearing. 83 Unfortunately, the use of this 
procedure is apt to be inversely proportionate to the anticipated 
value of the facilities at issue. 
The most effective limitation on Ashbacker problems is the 
"cut-off' rule. 84 This provides that the Commission give notice of 
pending applications and the time within which competing applica-
tions may be filed. No new applications are accepted during the 
course of the comparative proceeding. This procedure is responsive 
to Justice Douglas' comment in Ashbacker regarding "orderly ad· 
ministration. "85 It obviously does not solve all problems, but it re· 
duces the delays which can confront competing applications. 86 
If an application is procedurally complete, the Commission has 
little capacity to prevent it from being used to harass potential 
competitors. 87 Precisely because the Commission's hands are tied, 
relief ultimately may come from the Sherman Act88 rather than the 
Communications Act. To be sure, traditional learning taught that a 
section 2 action would not lie against a party's use of agency pro· 
cesses to delay a competitor's entry.89 But more recent cases indi· 
83. 47 C.F.R. § 1.603 (1977). A variation on this theme-as suggested in numer-
ous proposals-would be to grant licenses by an auction or a lottery. E.g., Botein, 
Comparative Broadcast Licensing and the Rule of Law: A Fuller InVest/gat/on, 6 
GA. L. REv. 743 (1972). 
84. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.227(b)(1), 1.571(c), 1.591(b) (1977). 
85. 326 U.S. at 333 n.9. See note 10 supra. 
86. See Century Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 310 F.2d 864, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1962); 
Ranger v. FCC, 294 F.2d 240, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Ridge Radio Corp. v. FCC, 292 
F,.2d 770, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
87. See note 15 and accompanying text supra. 
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). 
89. In Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 
145 (1961), the Supreme Court reversed a judgment granting damages and injunctive 
relief to a trucking firm. The complaint alleged that railroad companies had con-
spired to destroy competition in the long-distance freight business by advocating that 
the Pennsylvania Governor exercise his veto power over a legislative enactment that 
would have increased truck weight limits. Justice' Black, writing for a unanimous 
Court, stated that: 
[T]he starting point for our consideration of the case ... [is] that no viola-
tion of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influ-
ence the passage or enforcement of laws .... [I]t has been held that where 
a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of a valid governmental 
action, ... no violation of the Act can be made out. These decisions rest 
upon the fact that under our form of government the question whether a law 
of that kind should pass, or if passed be enforced, is the responsibility of the 
appropriate legislative or executive branch of government so long as the law 
itself does not violate some provision of the Constitution. 
Id. at 135-36 (footnotes omitted). See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 
(1943); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 560 (1939). Thus, filing 
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cate that an abuse of agency process to prevent new entry is action-
able. 90 Under section 1, a plaintiff presumably would be required 
to show that other broadcasters agreed to oppose its application for 
frivolous reasons; under section 2, that a single competitor pos-
sessed dominant market power. If these preconditions are satisfied, 
it may be possible to recover against a sham applicant for treble 
damages. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF ASHBACKER ON NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
Ashbacker creates problems not only in the regulation of con-
ventional broadcast media, but also in the Commission's treatment 
of new technologies. The doctrine creates a procedural strait jacket 
for any type of "broadcasting" under Title III of the Communica-
tions Act; if mutual exclusivity exists, the Commission has no 
choice but to hold a lengthy and expensive hearing. 91 In its regu-
lation of subscription television (STV), the Commission seems to 
have locked itself precisely into this bind. 
STV is one of several methods of transmitting programs to 
home viewers on a "pay" basis. Under the existing regulations, sta-
tions operating on frequencies listed in the television Table of As-
signments are permitted to allocate a portion of their time to non-
STV broadcasting.92 Although the technology for STV has existed 
an application for the purpose of harasSing a potential competitor would not consti-
ture an actionable restraint of trade inasmuch as the hearing process is a "valid 
governmental action" for the purpose of enforcing the Communications Act. 
90. In California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), 
the Court exempted from the Noerr holding antitrust claims alleging conspiracy to 
"bar ... competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals ... so [as] to 
usurp [the] decisionmaking process." Id. at 512. If a litigant could show a pattern of 
baseless claims which had the effect of barring access to an agency or court, then a 
valid antitrust action could be made out. Id. 
91. See, e.g., Digital Paging Sys., Inc., _ F.C.C.2d _ (Aug. 29, 1978), \yhere 
the Commission considered mutually exclusive applications for the right to construct 
a Multipoint Distribution Service facility. Board Member Kessler, in a concurring 
opinion, suggested that the requirements of section 309 and Ashbacker ought to be 
relaxed when "fledgling industr[ies)" are involved and proposed less formal hearings 
or a lottery as alternative methods of resolving such conflicts. In her closing remarks, 
after noting that more than thirty years had elapsed since Ashbacker, she stated that 
"it is now ... a new era where on the basis of criticisms of the comparative hearing 
process in broadcast cases by some members of the judiciary, it cannot be said that it 
would be impossible for them to revisit Ashbacker on the basis (a) of a newly de-
veloping industry, (b) of the Commission's past experience with the comparative 
formal hearing process, and (c) of their own experience." Id. at __ (Kessler, Board 
Member, concurring). 
92. 47 C.F.R. § 73.643(e) (1977). STY thus differs from "pay" cable television in 
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since the early 1960's, the Commission, at the urging of Congress, 
delayed its authorization until 1968.93 In adopting final rules, the 
Commission attempted to ensure that STV would supplement 
rather than supplant non-STV programming. 94 An applicant for 
an STV authorization thus must show that at least five other tele-
vision broadcast stations operate in its market, that there is no 
other station carrying STV in operation, and that the applicant 
will meet the Commission's standards for minimum amounts of 
programming. 95 Only recently has the Commission even proposed 
the adoption of STV cut-off rules. 96 
The Commission, with the approval of the District of Colum-
bia Circuit,97 was quick to classifY STV as a form of broadcasting, 98 
and gave little thought to the procedural consequences under 
Ashbacker. This classification of conventional television and STV as 
the same type of broadcast television would seem to generate the 
need for a hearing in at least three distinct situations. First, a hear-
ing appears to be necessary on two or more applications for stations 
with STV proposals for the same frequency and location. 99 Since 
neither party is an incumbent, procedural fairness would demand 
that they have an opportunity to test each other's claims. 
The rules also seem to require a hearing between an applicant 
for a station with STV and an applicant for a station without 
STV.100 At first glance, this approach seems to have some validity 
that the latter does not use broadcast frequencies to reach home viewers. 47 C.F.R. § 
76.5 (1977). 
93. See Subscription Television, Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 
469-72, 14 RAn. REG. 2d (P&F) 1601, 1605-09 (1968). 
94. 43 Fed. Reg. 1516, 1517 (1978) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R., Part 73). The 
Commission has concluded that STY may provide u a beneficial supplement to the 
conventional television programming and that, as an alternative medium, it might 
well provide a wholesome stimulus to free television which could lead to an im-
provement in overall programming available to the public." [d. 
95. 47 C.F.R. § 73.642 (1977). 
96. See 43 Fed. Reg. 1516, 1518 (1978) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R., Part 73). 
97. National Ass'n of Theater Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). 
98. See Subscription Television, Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 472, 
14 RAn. REG. 2d (P&F) 1601, 1609 (1968). 
99. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.642(a) (1977). Ashbacker problems arise because this regu-
lation permits only one STY authorization per community. Therefore, if several STV 
applications are filed for anyone community, they are necessarily mutually exclu-
sive. See 43 Fed. Reg. 1516, 1518 (1978) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R., Part 73). The 
Commission has also acknowledged that, as yet, there are no criteria for comparing 
mutually exclusive STY applications, but has given notice of its intention to propose 
regulations. [d. at 1519. 
100. Additional complications arise because an applicant for an STY license is 
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since both applications would be requesting the same-and a mutu-
ally exclusive-frequency and location. But in this situation, the 
Commission's rules could effectively give a preference to the appli-
cation for a non-STY station. The rules require an applicant for an 
STV station to show that it will have the same minimum amounts 
of "public service" programming as an applicant for a non-STY sta-
tion. lOl This places an STV applicant in the classic "Catch 22" situa-
tion. It cannot possibly promise as much "public service" program-
ming as an applicant for a non-STV station since, by definition, it 
proposes to reserve a substantial amount of its broadcast day for pay 
programs. Unless the Commission retreats from its traditional con-
sideration of "proposed programming" in comparative hearingsl02 
-which it has shown no inclination to do-an STV applicant oper-
ates under an inherent disadvantage. 
Finally, Ashbacker may require a hearing between two STV 
applications for different frequencies and locations if they arguably 
create mutual economic exclusivity. Although the Commission ini-
tially authorized only one STV station in an area, it later inter-
preted the rules to allow two or more stations in the same "mar-
ket" if located in different "communities" within that market. lo3 In 
the past, the Commission generally has dealt with mutual economic 
exclusivity in the context of petitions to deny rather than in the 
context of comparative hearings. lo4 However, there seems to be at 
least some impetus toward considering economic exclusivity in the 
comparative context. 105 
required either to hold a broadcasting license or a construction pennit or to be an 
applicant for a construction pennit. 47 C.F.R. § 73.642(a) (1977). As the FCC has 
recognized, this regulation "can confuse matters in a comparative situation." 43 Fed. 
Reg. 1516, 1519 (1978). The Commission is aware that, under the current regulations, 
unless all of the related applications are consolidated, undesirable results may 
occur-e.g., an applicant may be granted one application and not the other, thereby 
receiving a license he does not want or cannot use. At the same time, an application 
for a non-STY station which would ordinarily have been granted would be denied 
because it had conflicted with the application which was granted. Id. If, however, an 
applicant makes it "unmistakably clear" that it is only applying for a conventional 
station because of its desire to obtain an STY license, the Commission will consoli-
date the applications. Midwest St. Louis, Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 203, 205, 38 RAD. REG. 
2d (P&F) 569, 572 (1976). 
101. 47 C.F.R. § 73.642(b) (1977). 
102. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 397, 5 
RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1901, 1911 (1965). 
103. Subscription Television Authorizations, 55 F.C.C.2d 187, 192, 34 RAD. REG. 
2d (P&F) 1145, 1152 (1975). 
104. See text accompanying note 37 supra. 
105. Midwest St. Louis, Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 203, 38 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 569 (1976). 
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The Commission's application of Ashbacker to STV may thus 
raise a number of problems since it will, at best, serve to compli-
cate an already complex decisionmaking process. The Commission 
could, of course, escape from its own procedural pitfall by designat-
ing STV as a separate type of broadcast service. Hearings still 
would be necessary on STV applications which were either techni-
cally or economically mutually exclusive with other STV applica-
tions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The FCC's experience thus bears out Professor Davis' predic-
tion of two decades ago that "the Ashbacker doctrine has a large 
and complex nlture. "106 With that future now upon us, Ashbacker 
does not seem to have enhanced the administrative process. The 
Court formulated the doctrine to protect a party's right to partici-
pate in agency decisionmaking. Unfortunately, Ashbacker has too 
often become a smokescreen for dilatory tactics and procedural 
abuses. 
An obvious corrective measure would be to limit tactics such 
as linking.107 But this approach would still leave substantial room 
for other abuses. As noted before, under Ashbacker an agency has 
virtually no way of dismissing an application which is filed for the 
purpose of harassing a potential competitor. lOS 
In point of fact, Ashbacker and its progeny place the shoe on 
the wrong foot in terms of ensuring fair agency procedures-that is, 
with the agency rather than with the parties. Although applicants 
obviously need fair procedures, an agency cannot operate effec-
tively while under an absolute duty to consolidate. 
Instead, agencies should be free to use one of their most basic 
tools: discretion. The prospect of unbridled discretion is hardly at-
tractive since it is obviously prone to abuse. But modern theories 
concerning the administrative process have demonstrated that 
structural control109 and judicial reviewllO can effectively control 
administrative discretion. Thus, the time is ripe to reevaluate and 
perhaps remove Ashbacker's rigid constraints. 
106. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 8.12, at 576 (1958). 
107. See text accompanying note 70 supra. 
108. See text accompanying note 12 supra. 
109. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELn.nNARY INQUIRY (1969). 
1l0. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). 
